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(id put them in dmgs so they cant dos your filesystem)
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so here are the details in english.įiles access restricted to the virtual machines own folder (since im not using shared folders or drag and drop) but if you wanted to use those, you grant access to specific folder for that purpose. Ive only looked over the sanbox docs, havent done much with them yet. only when os x is part of the vagrant file, will i run vagrant/virtualbox outside of the dev vm. but i still think vmware should have the sandbox.ītw, props to vmware on their nested virtualization! i do almost all my vagrant runs in vmware using virtualbox and its faster than the host os (linux) on my thinkpad which is also an i7 with ssd. maybe the xhyve docker running a samba server. the only thing left would be the usb canary, and i think something could be made with apples hypervisor framework. I think with more work on sandboxing, sip and pf, a similar level of security with more usability can had without all this overhead. i just use scp and ssh cat for file copies, not using drag and drop anymore. i do know ssh and pf from many years of openbsd. i havent read through the open-vm-tools so i dont really know how they work. It might look like glaring hole to use ssh for host to vm communications. that leaves containing the vmware instances as last "scary" part of the setup. apple already took care of that using the iommu with hardware that has it. One thing not mentioned was malicious device attacks other than usb, which really only leaves thunderbolt. i would love to steal qubes-os window management for things like clipboard management and file transfer, but for now ill use ssh. this setup (plus good backups) easily counters the ransomware thats been going around lately. let me leave the macbook in my hotel room without worring about the evil maid". mine is "make host os exploit non trivial. i realize we all have different ideas of whats reasonable.
Apple sandbox file type pdf mac#
The goal is not qubes-os level security, just a reasonable level while still having a mac be a mac. I'll put this on github when i write some docs for it, but heres a quick description of what im doing, by definition one of the reasons we contain virtual machines is having less trust in them than the host os. sandbox-exec offers the same kind of protection. when kvm had venom, most distros already had that mitigated by app armor or selinux, which is default in libvirt. I realize that seems unlikely, but this shows up once in a while (directory traversal, cloudburst etc). Still, your idea has merit and I would like to see you describe your threat model in detail, as well as your proposed sandboxing implementation - which sandbox settings contain which threats. I could be foolishly naive, but I am not very concerned about a multiple escalation attack like the one I described. When appropriate, I can isolate the guest OS to its own virtual LAN behind the firewall, so that it cannot see or attack other systems in the local network. I never share the home directory with the guest OS. I protect the Mac host by limiting the guest to isolated shared folders, usually just one. I am not saying it is impossible, but my threat models are focused mainly on protecting the guest OS and the Mac host itself. After that, the malware exploits flaws in the guest OS and VMware to attack the host VMware instance, and then exploit that to attack the host Mac computer itself (and from there, attack other systems on the LAN or Internet). If I read this correctly, you are concerned that malware will attack the guest operating system, and then recognize that the guest OS is running in a virtual machine. Can you please be more descriptive about the threat(s) that you are trying to contain? This is an interesting idea, but I am trying to wrap my head around your threat model.